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Abstract 
We propose an abductive diagnosis theory that 
integrates probabilistic, causal and taxonomic 
knowledge. Probabilistic knowledge allows us 
to select the most likely explanation; causal 
knowledge allows us to make reasonable inde­
pendence assumptions; taxonomic knowledge 
allows causation to be modeled at different lev­
els of detail, and allows observations be de­
scribed in different levels of precision. 
Unlike most other approaches where a causal 
explanation is a hypothesis that one or more 
causative events occurred, we define an expla­
nation of a set of observations to be an occur­
rence of a chain of causation events. These cau­
sation events constitute a scenario where all the 
observations are true. We show that the prob­
abilities of the scenarios can be computed from 
the conditional probabilities of the causation 
events. 
Abductive reasoning is inherently complex even 
if only modest expressive power is allowed. 
However, our abduction algorithm is exponen­
tial only in the number of observations to be 
explained, and is polynomial in the size of the 
knowledge base. This contrasts with many 
other abduction procedures that are exponen­
tial in the size of the knowledge base. 
1 Introduction 
Abduction is the inference to the best explanation. To 
arrive at the best explanation, an abductive reasoner 
must make use of information from disparate sources. 
For the problem of abductive diagnosis, efforts have 
been made to integrate probabilistic and causal knowl­
edge [Cooper, 1984; Peng and Reggia, 1987; Pearl, 1988; 
Lin and Goebel, 1990a], causal and taxonomic knowl­
edge [Patil, 1987; Kautz, 1987]. None of these, however, 
is able to accommodate all three kinds of knowledge. 
The difficulties of integrating causal and taxonomic 
knowledge include the following: 
1. Although the links in belief networks [Pearl, 1988; 
Cooper, 1984] are not limited to causal links, "isa" 
links cannot be treated in the same ways as other 
links in the belief networks. (We elaborate in Sec­
tion 6.2.) 
2. Probability alone is not enough to rank explana­
tions. For example, the probability of getting sick 
is never less than that of getting a cold. However, 
the former is not necessarily a better diagnosis than 
the latter. 
We propose an abductive diagnosis theory that in­
tegrates probabilistic, causal, and taxonomic knowl­
edge. Probabilistic knowledge allows us to select the 
most likely explanation; causal knowledge allows us to 
make reasonable independence assumptions; taxonomic 
knowledge allows causation to be modeled at different 
levels of detail and observations be described at differ-
ent levels of precision. �.· 
Our model represents domain knowledge with a causal 
network. Unlike most other approaches, where a causal 
explanation is a hypothesis that one or more causative 
events occurred, we define an explanation of a set of 
observations to be the occurrence of a chain of causa­
tion events. These causation events constitute a scenario 
where all the observations are true. We show that the 
probabilities of the scenarios can be computed from the 
conditional probabilities of the causation events. 
Computational inefficiency has been a major difficulty 
with abductive reasoning systems. Abductive reason­
ing is inherently complex even if only modest expressive 
power is allowed. Our algorithm, however, is exponen­
tial only in the number of observations to be explained, 
and is polynomial in the size of the knowledge base. This 
contrasts with many other abduction procedures that are 
exponential in the size of the knowledge base. 
In the next section, we explain the notion of causation 
event. Section 3 introduces the concept of scenario. In 
Section 4, we show that the probability of a scenario can 
be computed from the conditional probability of causa­
tion events. In Section 5, the problem of finding the 
most probable explanation is solved by relating it to the 
Steiner Problem in Graphs [Dreyfus and Wagner, 1972]. 
Relationship to other research is discussed in Section 
6. Our contributions to abductive diagnosis are sum­
marized in Section 7. 
---- -----
2 Causation events 
The concept of causation event was first introduced by 
Peng and Reggia [Peng and Reggia, 1987] to explicitly 
represent the statement "x actually caused y." A causa­
tion event C"'-+ e is true "iff both [the cause event] c and 
[the effect event] e occur and e is actually being caused 
by c [Peng and Reggia, 1987, p.149]." One of the mo­
tivations for distinguishing causation events from other 
events in a probabilistic causal world is that C"'-+ e cannot 
be expressed by a Boolean expression of the events c and 
e, because in situations where both c and e occur, C"'-+ e 
may still be false. 
Unfortunately, Peng and Reggia's definition of cau­
sation event does not provide a way to judge whether 
a causation event occurred, because, unlike other basic 
events, causation events are usually unobservable. We 
can only observe the co-occurrence of the cause and ef­
fect. 
Here we present a definition of causation event follow­
ing a suggestion from PearF. First, note that causation 
can be modeled at different levels of details [Patil, 1987]. 
A causation event at one level of representation may cor­
respond to a chain of micro causation events at a more 
refined level. If c ...__. e corresponds to a chain of micro 
causation events c-..... it, it-..... i2, ... in"'-+ e then, when 
c..._.. e occurs, not only must c and e must occur, but also 
must the intermediate micro events it, ... , in. 
Definition 2.1 (causation event) A causation event, 
denoted by c "'-+ e, is false iff there do not exist micro 
events it, ... , in at a more refined level of representation 
such that c-..... it, it-..... i2, . . .  in-..... e is a chain of micro 
� causation events and e, it, ... , in, c co-occur. 
With this definition, c and e must be true if C"'-+ e is true. 
3 Knowledge representation 
We use a language< E, C, H >to represent the domain 
knowledge, where 
1. E is a finite, non-empty set of events, each repre­
senting the presence of a disorder, a symptom or a 
pathological state. 
2. C C E x E is the set of causation events. 
3. H C E X E is the "isa" relation in E. C and H 
are disjoint. We use e1 � e2 to denote that et is 
an e2 and �* to denote the reflexive and transitive 
closure of the "isa" relation. 
The diagrammatic form of the language is a causal 
network where each node represents an element in E. 
Elements inC and H are represented by causal and "is a" 
links respectively. Figure 1 shows an example of causal 
network. 
Definition 3.1 (scenario) A scenano as a pair 
(culprit, causations), where culprit E E, and 
causations C C. Participants in a scenario are the 
events in E that must be true in the scenario. We define 
scenario and its participants recursively as follows: 
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Figure 1: A causal network 
1. Let c E E. Then (c, 0) is a scenario and 
participants(c, 0) = {c}. 
2. Let (a, a) be a scenario. Let c0 be a maximally 
specific event in par ticipant s( a, a) , i.e., -,3d ::j: 
co, d�*co, d E participants( a, a) . Let Ct be an 
event such that co�*Ct. Let ( Ct, {3) be a scenario 
such that 
a. an{3=0; 
b. {3 = {c1..,...c2} U-y and (c2, "Y) is a scenario. 
c. there does not exist a scenario ( c3, {3') such 
h ioa ioa d {3' d t at Co-->*C3-->*Ct, Ct '""' C2 Jl: an 
participants( Ct, "Y) n participants( C3, {3') ::j: 0 
and (a, a U  {3') is a scenario. 
Then (a, aU{3) is a scenario and participants( a, aU 
{3) = participants( a, a) U participants( c11 {3). 
The condition 2.c ensures that the scenario ( Ct, {3) is 
not preempted by a more specific scenario when com­
bined with (a, a). When such (c3, {3') exists, at least 
some part of ( c2 , "Y) is related to co via a more specific 
class. Ct is called the reference class of co with respect 
to ( c2, "Y). This notion of reference class is a generaliza­
tion of the one in [Kyburg Jr., 1982], where the reference 
class is with respect to a property. 
In Figure 2, for example, 2. (d, {b..,... e,d--.... g}), 3. 
{c,{a-.....e}) and 4. {f, { f -.....g, a"'-+e}) are scenarios; 
whereas 5. (d, {a�e}) is not a scenario, because a-.....e 
is preempted by b"'-+ e. 
Given a set of observations, explanations are scenarios 
where the observations are true. Such a scenario can 
be regarded as a tentative reconstruction of the causal 
evolution which has led to the observations. 
Definition 3.2 (explanation) An explanation for a 
set of observations 0 is a scenario (a, a) such that 
0 C participants( a, a) and a E D, where D C E is 
the set of disorders. 
For example, in Figure 2, 2. and 4. are explanations 
for {e, g}. 
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Figure 2: Scenario are subtrees of the causal network 
Multiple independent disorders To allow for mul­
tiple independent disorders, we can add a distinguished 
event T to the set of disorders D and causation events 
T..,... d for all disorder d such that d has no other causes. 
T is always true and T ...__.. d is true iff d is true. When 
T is the culprit of a scenario, the scenario may contain 
multiple independent disorders. 
4 Probabilities of scenarios 
A probability space is a triple (0, A, P) [Galambos, 
1988], where n is the sample space, A is a u-field of 
subsets of n and p is a real-valued probability function 
P: A ........ [0, 1]. 
In the probability space we use, n consistists of as­
signments of truth values to the elements in E U C, i.e., 
n = {!If: C U H �--+ {0 , 1}}. The set of events, A, con­
sists of all subsets of n. Corresponding to each element e 
of EUC, there is a basic event in A: {!If E n, f(e) = 1}. 
Without confusion, we also denote this basic event by e. 
It can be seen that all the events may be constructed 
by intersection and complement operations on the basic 
events. 
Let x E E, x ..,... y E C and a = {Xi ...__.. Yi I i = 
1, . . .  , n, Xi...__.. Yi E C}, we write P(x), P(x..,... y), and 
P( a) to denote the probabilities of x, x--.... y and a re­
spectively. A scenario is true if and only if the culprit 
event is true and all the causation events in the scenario 
are true. Therefore the probability of a scenario (a, a) 
is P(a, a) , the joint probability of its culprit a and the 
causation events a. 
4.1 Independence assumption 
Let (a, a), co and (c1,/3) be defined as in Definition 3.1. 
Then we assume (a, a) is conditionally independent of /3 
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given c1: 
P(/3lc1, a, a)= P(/3icl) 
Intuitively, this assumption means that whatever 
caused c1 can only influence the effects of c1 via c1. This 
assumption is similar to the axioms of belief networks in 
[Pearl, 1988]. 
4.2 Probabilities of scenarios 
Theorem 4.1 Let (a, a) be scenario. Then 
P(a, a)= P(a) X IT P(x ........ ylx) 
�Eo 
Proof: This theorem is proved by induction on the 
structure of scenarios. 
Base Case: a= 0, P(a,a) = P(a). 
Induction Step: Let (a, a), co, and (c1,/3) be defined as 
in Definition 3.1. Then, (a, aU /3) is a scenario and 
P(a, aU /3) 
= P(a, a, /3) 
= P(/31a, a) x P(a, a) 
= P(/3icl, a, a) x P(a, a) 
( ." c0 E participants( a) and co�*cl) 
= P(/3icl) x P(a, a) 
( by the independence assumption) 
= � x P(a,a) 
= TI'""'!!E.B P(x..,...ylx) x P(c1)/ P(cl) 
X n""'!/EO P(x ........ ylx) X P(a) 
( by the induction assumption) 
= n�eau,B P(x ........ ylx) X P(a) I 
Example 4.2 The probability of the scenario in Figure 
2.2 is 
P(d,d ........ g,b ........ e) = P(d) x P(d ........ gld) x P(b--....elb) 
Corollary 4.3 Let (a, a) be a scenario. Then 
log( p(l,a)) = log( PCa)) + I:""'!/Ea log( p(�lx)) 
Estimating the conditional probabilities In [Lin 
and Goebel, 1990b], we have shown that under rea­
sonable assumptions about causal influence, P(elc) -
P(c ........ elc) < P(e). Therefore, when P(e) is significantly 
less than P(elc), which is usually the case, P(c ...__.. elc) 
can be approximated by P(elc). 
5 Finding the most probable 
explanation 
We now quantify the causal link from node x to node 
y by a weight log( p(�lx)) and associate weight 0 with 
"isa" links and a weight log( PCx)) with each node x. 
Then for any explanation (a, a), log( P( l,a)) is the to­
tal weight of all the links in (a, a) plus the weight of the 
root. Since maximizing P( a, a) is equivalent to minimiz­
ing log( P(;,a)), the problem of finding the most proba­
ble explanation becomes that of finding the minimum 
weight explanation. The latter problem is a variation of 
a graph-theoretic problem known as the Steiner Problem 
in Graphs which can be formally stated as follows: 
Definition 5.1 (Steiner Problem in Graphs) Let 
G = < N, E > be a weighted graph, where N is the set 
of nodes and E is the set of edges. Each edge e E E is 
associated with a non-negative weight w(e). Given a set 
of node S � N, the Steiner Problem in Graphs asks for 
a sub-tree T � E, such that, 
a. all nodes in S are connected together by T; 
b. L:eeT w( e) is minimal. 
The minimal tree is called the Steiner Tree (connecting 
S). 
It is well known that the Steiner Problem in Graphs is 
NP-Complete [Garey and Johnson, 1979, p. 208]. This, 
however, does not imply that our model is computa­
tionally intractable. The admissible inputs must also 
be taken into consideration lLevesque, 1989). A crucial 
observation here is that the number of observations to be 
explained in a single case is usually small, much smaller 
than the number of nodes in the network. 
In [Lin and Goebel, 1990a], we present an algorithm 
for finding the most probable explanations in networks 
without "isa" links. The algorithm simulates a set of pro­
cesses distributed over the nodes in the networks. Each 
process performs the same local algorithm, which con­
sists of receiving, processing and sending messages that 
are transmitted across the edges. The messages contain 
optimal solutions for smaller subproblems. These sub­
solutions are combined at the receiver node to generate 
larger optimal solutions, which in turn are sent further. 
The worst case complexity is 0(3kn+ 2ke), where k is the 
number of observations to be explained, n and e are the 
number of nodes and edges in the network, respectively. 
The average complexity is reduced by exploiting the lo­
cality of the nodes to be connected. The nodes that are 
unrelated to the observations will not be involved in the 
computation at all. 
The algorithm in [Lin and Goebel, 1990a] can be ex­
tended to deal with taxonomic structure in the network 
by adding local constraints to the process at each node. 
The transmission and combination of the messages are 
governed by the local constraints such that only the 
weight of valid scenarios are computed and minimized. 
The complexity of the revised algorithm is 0(3kn+k 2k e). 
6 Relationship to other research 
6.1 Early expert systems 
Research on abductive diagnosis was pioneered by early 
expert systems such as CASNET [Weiss et al., 1978] and 
INTERNIST [Miller et al., 1982]. The need for integrat­
ing probabilistic, causal and taxonomic knowledge has 
been recognized in the design of these systems [Fin in and 
Morris, 1988]. Although these systems have achieved sig­
nificant results, they have often been criticized for their 
use of poorly defined and unjustified weighting schemes 
and scoring heuristics as well as unreasonable assump­
tions about probability distributions. 
In contrast, the weighting and scoring scheme in our 
model are based on formal probability theory. We have 
also provided a clear specification of the diagnosis task. 
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6.2 Belief Network 
Belief networks [Pearl, 1988] are directed acyclic graphs 
in which each node represents a random variable (or un­
certain quantity) which can take on two or more possi­
ble values. Causal explanations are instantiations of the 
variables of the causal network and are obtained by a 
distributed message propagation. The propagation al­
gorithm, however, is designed for singly connected net­
works, ( i.e. networks with no undirected loops) [Pearl, 
1988]. Although he also proposed two extensions to mul­
tiply connected networks ( clustering and conditioning), 
both methods are liable to exponential complexity [Hen­
rion, 1987]. 
Another problem with the belief revision procedure is 
that an explanation consists of instantiations for all the 
variables in the network. This implies that every piece 
of evidence must be propagated to the entire network, 
even to the totally irrelevant sections of the knowledge 
base [Pearl, 1988, p. 259]. As was discussed in [Lin and 
Goebel, 1989], our message passing algorithm is able to 
exploit the locality of the observations to be explained. 
The nodes that are unrelated to the observations are not 
activated during the message passing process. 
a
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·
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/
e 
·· •
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P(a'ld')=\ 
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d d' 
( 1) (2) 
Figure 3: Isa link must be treated differently 
"Isa" links cannot be trivially included in belief net­
works because an a � b cannot be simply treated as 
a link for which P(bla) = 1. Comparing (1) and (2) 
in Figure 3, for example, the influence of d on e via a 
should be preempted by the link from d toe, whereas in 
(2), the influence of d' one' via the two paths should be 
combined. 
6.3 Evidential recognition 
Shastri [Shastri, 1989] has studied evidential reasoning 
in a network representation language. Nodes in his net­
work represent concepts, and there are two kinds of links: 
"isa" links and "has-property" links. A "has-property" 
link from concept c to the value v of a property p denotes 
that the concept c may have v as the value for property 
p. The num_ber of instances of c is denoted by #c and 
the number of those having v as the value for property p 
is denoted by #c[p, v]. An example is given in Figure 4. 
The number in the box is the number of known instances 
of the concept. The number by an edge is the number 
of instances having that property value. 
An important feature of the representation language 
is the partial specification of statistical information. If 
#c[p, v] is not specified for a concept c, it may be inher­
ited from a maximally specific super class c' of c with 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 4: Knowledge about fruits 
#c'fp, v] specified. c' is said to be relevant to c with 
respect to [p, v]. 
Evidential recognition may be described as follows: 
given a set of candidate concepts C-SET= {cl> c2, • • .  , en} 
and a description DESCR= {fpl> v1], [p2, v2], . . •  ,
fpm, vm]}, where [pi, vi] is a property value pair, find c* E 
C-SET such that c• is the most likely concept described 
by DESCR among C-SET. For example, given C-SET= 
{apple, grape}, DESCR= { [has-color, green], [has-taste, 
sour]}, find which of apple and grape is more likely. Ev­
idential recognition is abductive in the sense that one is 
seeking the concept that best exemplifies the described 
properties. 
Shastri identified two sets of assumptions which when 
satisfied, allows the most probable concept to b� com­
puted using the principle of maximum entropy. The 
first is the "Unique relevant concept" assumption [Shas­
�ri, 1989, p.337], i.e., for each property-value pair fp, v] 
m DESCR, there exists a unique concept relevant to a 
candidate concept c with respect to fp, v]. The sec­
ond assumption is more complex; checking whether a 
given C-SET satisfies the assumption may take exponen­
tial time in the worst case. 
The representation language in [Shastri, 1989] is in­
adequate to represent causal knowledge because unlike 
properties, which are directly associated with concepts, 
symptoms may be indirectly caused by disorders. There­
fore, Shastri's representation language does not provide 
any mechanism to model causal chaining. Note further, 
that the user is required to supply the set of candidate 
concepts C-SET. 
Our algorithm for diagnosis may also be used for evi­
dential recognition in Shastri's network. To do this, we 
associate log( #t,v]) with the "has-property" link from 
concept c to property value v and log( �c) with node c. 
The most probable concept is found by connecting the 
nodes representing the property values in DESCR, using 
our algorithm for diagnosis. 
When the "Unique relevant concept" assumption 
is satisfied, Vc E C-SET, there is only one sce­
nario (c, a) containing DESCR. The total weight of 
this scenario is log(#c ) + I:(p,v]eDESCRlog(#�f:.vJ) 
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where Cp is the relevant concept of c with respect 
to fp, v]. The minimization of the weight is equiv­
alent to maximization of the score in [Shastri, 1989, 
p.337]: #c TI[p,v]eDESCR #'if.�·"1. Therefore, our algo­
rithm gives the same answer as Shastri's. 
7 Conclusion 
We have described a model of abductive diagnosis that 
is relatively efficient, and that can make use of causal 
probabilistic and taxonomic knowledge about a proble� 
domain. Our representation is based on an elaboration 
of Peng and Reggia's idea of "causation event," extended 
to account for the intuition behind multiple levels of cau­
sation. 
The network form of causation relations is similar to 
Pearl's belief networks, but uses a Steiner Tree algorithm 
to identify scenarios which constitute the required ex­
planations for observed symptoms. In addition, a nat­
ural independence assumption allows relatively efficient 
computation of the probability of the most likely sce­
nario without requiring that probabilities be propagated 
throughout the complete network. 
Finally, we provide a definition of scenario that ac­
commodates the notion of taxonomic knowledge by pro­
viding a restriction to most specific scenarios. The ex­
tended definition permits us to express taxonomic rela­
tions amongst events, and retain the probabilistic rank­
ing of scenarios. 
Much work remains, including the application of our 
model to provide important feedback about the clarity 
of the model's semantics, as well as further evidence of 
its practical efficiency. 
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